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European countrics arc inçreasingly subject to two constraints on tho man
agement of their public polîcy. The i'ir.st one is tho constraint on budget déf
icits, forcing governmcnts to contrn! their total expenditures. The second
one is the opinion shared by mosi of t.hr European countries, that compé
tition in corporatc taxes would be harmfulr>. Indced, during the last twenty
years, in a context of deeper trade intégration and capital mobility. govern-
inonts hâve signifie an tly reduced their statutory corporatc tax rates to pro-
mote their attractiveness (sec Devereux, Griffilh and Klcmm, 2002)(i. In a
pessimistic scénario, this race to the bottom would rcsult in a lower level of
tax incarne and suboptimal public expenditures l'or immobile houscholds
(Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 198(>). Under the assumption that govcrnmonts
are awarc of thèse négative offects, we eau autieipatc that, in the future,
statutory corporatc tax rates will bc less frequently mauipulatcd to attract
the firme. Tluis, Lhc existence of thèse two constraints suggests that the
analysis of the allocation choice of public expenditures is particularly rele
vant. This is the question wc raise in this article.
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For example, the Code of Conduct for business taxation adopted by the European Union requires member
states to refrain from introducing any new harmful tax measurcs such as an effective level of taxation which
is significantly lower than the gênerai level of taxation in the country concerned.
The average statutory corporate tax rate in the EU-!5 members was 33.5% in 2001 and 28% in 2006. We
observe a similar tendency for the main new entrants (Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia):
28% in 2001 and 18% in 2006 (source: OECD tax dalabase).
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Despite the obvious policy rclevancc of the .subjcct, there is no thco-
retical contribution dealing witli the relationship betwceri économie intégra
tion and the destination of public expendit lires. Recently, some économie
geography modèle hâve provîded a new analysis of public policîes. By
assuming imperfectly integrated économies and increasing returns to scale,
t.his literature shows that a race to the bottom in taxation of capital is not
unavoidable and the tax policier dépend on the level of trade costs (see
BaldwÎE and Krugraan, 2004; Andersson and Forslid, 2003; Ludenia and
Wooton, 2000; Kind, Midelfart-Knarvik and Schjclderup, 2000; Ottaviano
and van Ypersclc. 200")} l0. Nevertheleas, this literature ïoeuses on the tax
policy and does not investigate what the choice of public spending would be
for a given tax policy. Gonversely, Keen and Marchand (1997) and Mat su-
moto (2000) analyzo the way compétition among governments distorts the
patteru of public apending, but with the assuinption that the économies are
perfectly integrated.
Our modol is based on the monopolise compétition framework with
mobile firms and immobile housenalds deveïoped by Ottaviano and Vnn
Yperscle (2005). Public spe-uding lias two possible allocations: a direct sub-
sidy to households or a, wage subsidy to mobile fini in. Shipping the good pro-
duced in the monopolistic compétitive sector is costly and we assume that;
the labor prodiictivity in thïs sector is différent among countrics. Govcrn-
meuts arc benevolent, they choose the allocation of their public spending so
fis to maximize the welfare of the households. We neutralize tax compatit ion
by assuming exogenous capital and labor taxes in order to isolate the impact
of trade intégration on the choice of public spending. Nevortheless, with
part of the tax base being mobile, tax revenues collected in each country are
euciogenous.
We show thaï the firms receive a lower net of tax subsidy in the high-
productivity country than in the low-produeiivity one. Despite this less
gênerons policy, the former country eau host a larger share of firms, so that
îts total spending for finns can be higher than in the low-productivity coun
try when trade costs arc low enough. In tins case, households arc the net-
contributors to the budget in both countrics. The welfare analysis suggests
that the second-best optimum requires an increas<; in the subsidy to house
holds in both countries when the économies arc weakly integrated or the
prodiictivity gap ia low or the share of capital incomes redistributed outside
the two économies is lngh.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows, The model is deveïoped
in the next section. In section 3. we investigate the spatial distribution of
finns, the resulting subsidy equiiibrium and the composition of public
10 See the chapier 4 in the book al Baldwin et al. (2003) for an exhaustive présentation of the contribution o)
the New Economie Geography litoraturc to the analysis in 1he tax policies.Neily Exbrayat, Cari Gaigné, Stéphane Riou 411
produeed in counlry r from a consumer living in country r (g,.,.) andeoun-
try s with s# r (qra):
qyy - a - (b -h m) prr + cPT qr6 = « - (6 + cn)prs + cPs (3)
where tt=ab. b=l/\0+(n-l)S\, c= ôh/(p- S) and /;,.,. (resp.. pra) îs
thc price of a variety produeed in country r for consumers of country r
(resp., s), Finally,
Pr = nrj)rr + ««?«■ PS = «,./>,.* + V?,,/),4., (4)
are thc prier indices (i.c, n tinics thc average price) of varieties in country
r and in country s, reapectively, with nT and ns the ninnbor of varieties/
firni.s located in r and s.
2.2 Private sector
Thc Brins from the traditional aector produce a hoiuogcneous good (the
numéraire) under perfect compétition and constant rotnrns to scale. Onc
unit of output requires one unit of labor. Thc T-good is traded without cost
between countries 80 that ite price as wbII ay thc wage rate in that sector
are vx\\v,\\ to uiiity in cach country l~. As workers arc mobile acroas sectors,
the wage rate is also equaJ to 1 in the modem sector in both countries .
Each varîcty is produeed by a single firm in the modéra sector. Wc
assume that the production of any variety requires a country-specifie fixed
amount <pr of labor / with
In other words, we assume that country i has an advautage in ternis of pro-
ductivity in the modéra sector . Moreover, varieties of the M-good are
traded at. a cost of r units of the ninuériiirc per unit, shipped between thc
two countries. As firms bear thèse brade costs, profits of a représentative
firm in country r are as follows:
where /.,. is the unit tax in country /■ and fr is the subsidy receivcd by a
firm established in country r for each worker it employa .
The Iraditional sector is periectly compétitive and firms in this sector are immobile. Hence, govornments
hâve no incentive to give them a subsidy.
This resuit holds when the sector T is active in both countries. which we suppose to be checked.
It is necessary to normalize the marginal cost to zéro in order to get analytical results when solving (or the
subsirjy choices made by governments. This assumption is also made by Ottaviano and Van Ypersele (2005).
As the subsidy is linked to employmenl, it is not a simple tax déduction. This kind of subsidy is more and more
advocated. For example, a récent report on government aid to private firms in France indicates lhat 43% of
the publics funds allocated to firms are aimed at decreasing Ihe labor cost (cf. Inspection Générale, 2007).Nelly Exbrayat, Cari Gaigné, Stéphane Riou . 413
' = ~2/T ~ a^nrPpr + n*P**) "f f(r^ + '«■) - 2{"'/Jr'' + "•£«•)■
As we arc interestcd in the pattcrn of public oxpenditurcs, we con-
sidcr taxes as givcn. Public cxpcnditures and tax revenues are respcctivcly
given by Gy=hrl + <p,-!,nY and Tr= prl+ trnr. Dcspito the exogencity of
taxes, observe that tax revenues are endogenous as the firms are mobile. More-
over, since the budget constramt requires that G,. - Tr , we gct:
(K-pJl= (lr-</>Jr)n, (8)
A.s taxes are exogenous, we will deal with the net subsidy received by
firms ( Er) and workers (//,.}, that is:
HrsV Pr (10)
The redistributive property of governmcnts1 public policy appears
through the equality (8). Indcod. as soon as workers receive a positive net
subsidy ( Hr>0), they are the net beneficiary of the publie funds and as a
conséquence the inercase in their subsidy raises the net contribution of firms
to the public funds.
3 Nash subsidies and location equilibrium
Tho model conwists in a sequential game involving two main players, firms
and governmcnts. In the first stage, each government simultancousfy chooses
its wage subsidy for firms ff taking as givcn the décision of the other govern
ment. and anticipating the impact of its décision on the private sector out-
come and the location equilibrium. In stage 2. givcn the choiecs amiounced
by governments, Firms choose their place of production. Ail players havo a
perfect information and the game is solved by a sub-game perfect equilibrium
involving backward induction beginning with tin; laat stage.
3.1 Location equilibrium
The location of firms in Hector M is governed by the spatial différence in
net profits evaluated at equilibrium priées. At the location equilibrium. no
firm is incited to change its location. Lei X m nx/n dénote the sharc of firms
located in country f. Formally, an interior equilibrium X g (0;I) occurs if
and only if A(/T) = 7Tr(X*) - fts(X*) = 0. The location forces driving this
location eciuilibrium are the followïng. For given taxes and subsidies. the
productivity advantage of country "I makes it more attractive. Nevertheless.Nelly Exbrayat, Cari Gaigné, Stéphane Riou 415
constraint (S) to substitute the: subsidy to workers, we get the following first-
order condition:
dWr^dSrdn; dn* dir*r
at,. onj.uE,. oET oEr
surplus effect rerfiatrlb ut ive efffcl profil offcol
By attractiug new firms, an increasc in fhe leveî of net subsidy to
firms raises the numbor of varieties produced on the domostic market and
intensifies price compétition (surplus effect). The sign of the redistributive
effect dépends on whether the firms are net récipients (Er>0) or net con-
tributors (Er< 0 ) of the public funds. The impact of an iucrease in Er on
profils rcccivcd by résidents (profit effect) is alwo not obvious. If an increase
in the net subsidy to finns directly improves its net profit, it also indirectly
intensifies price compétition and thus damages ifs gross profit. The net
effect is finally positive.
The Nash cquilibrium is described by the following levels of net subsidy
for finns:
El - -B& -I- C(r) and E£ - B& -I- C(r) (12)
whero 0 < B< 1/2 and C'( r) > 0 (for admissible values of T and y) are given
by:
B s 8ô + cn(5-27)
C (r)
2 (126 +m (7-27))
(6 + m) (cV(l - 7/2) + ben (3 - 7) + &)lr2
2(2b+ai
Clearly, govennnents are incitcd to pay subsirhes invcrsely propor-
tional to the productivité' level in their country . Thus, at tlie Nash ec[iii-
libriinu. the govorninent of couiitry 2 chooses the highest level of net subsidy
to finns:
e; - ei = we > n.
Indeed. the low-productivity country sets a more generous public pol-
tcy for each firm in order to limit its productivity disadvantage. Couse-
qncntly. a réduction in tlie productivity vvedge between countries dccrea.ses
the international différence in net subsidies lo finns {ci(E.y - El)/d0> 0 ).
Additionally. the more important the share of profits that rcmains in the
economy. the more similar tlie levels of net subsidv lo each firm are in each
Wilh lhe expression B, , we can define a condition on /. ensuring thaï at lhe Nash equi!ibrium, lhe net cosl
of employing a worker is still posilivo ( l - /,' > 0 ). For counlries 1 and 2 respeclively, Ihese conditions are
given by àt > /, - !W+ C and <;>, > L, + SB+ C. We assume they are fulllilled throughoul lhe analysis.Nelly Exbrayat, Cari Gaigné, Stéphane fliou 417
To sunuaarize:
Proposition 1 The govcmment of the, low-producMvïty country sets a
higher level ofnet subsidy for eachfirm than in the high-productivity country,
but attracts a minovity of firms.
The net subsidies received by households arc given by:
Hi-=Bpï imd Hi = -E^l-V". (14)
They hâve the opposite sign to Er. Intuitivcly, the households are net
boiieficîaiy fresp. net contributors) of tlio public fnuds if the firms are net
contribuions (resp. tiet. récipients). TIlus, since Brins located in country 2
are always net récipients of tlie public fïmds { E., > 0 ). tlie hou.sehold.s living
in tlii.s country pav always more taxes than the amount of subsidies they
receive (//._,< 0 ). In country 1. the status of households with respect to the
public expenditure polîcy îs more ambiguons. Il is indirectly relatcd to the
international productivity wedge on the one hand, aud to the level of trade
costb on the other hand. Indeed, wc gct [J* = {) if and only if:
0 = C(t)/B.
Moreover, wc can easily chedk that 0"'jo1" > C{r)fU if and only if:
2a [h + ai)
Thus, as soon as r < f (bo that 0a'Jfjl" < C \t) /I3), we gel ll\ < 0
for ail interior cquilibria.. Stated dif'fcreiitly, the liouseholds of the most pro
ductive country are net contributors of the public funds when économies
arc integratcd enough. Abovc the thrcshold f of trade costs, both configu
rations can émerge depeuding on the size of the productivity wedge and the
level of trade costs. To sum up:
Proposition 2 For ail interior equilibria, the households living in the
low-produetivity country arc always net conlribuiovs of the public junds. By
coutrasL, the households living in the high-prodiicl.ivity country become net
récipients of the public funds provided that trade coêts and/or the produc
tivity davantage are high enough.
3.3 Composition of public expenditures
We now analyze the aggregal.ed amount of public expenditures aliocated to
firms and households in each country. Lel. A/C s X"uE\ — {1 — \")" nE^
dénote the international différence in aggregated net aubsidies to firniH. We
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parcd to those living in the other country. Thus, in the last stage of inté
gration, trade agrecmcnts could improve tlie situation of households living
in thc low-productivity country with respect to the public policy as com-
pared to houscholds living in thc liigh-productivity country.
To summarizc:
Proposition 4 Tradc intégration first reduces and then exacerbâtes
the international différence in the composition of public expendilures.
Thcrc arc fcw cmpirioal studies intercyted in the impact of tradc inté
gration on the composition of public expendilures. Drehcr et al. (2008) show
that globalisation did not hâve a significant impact on the composition of
public expenditurcs in OECD countries between 1971 and 2001. By con-
trast, Sanz and Velasquez (2004) analyse the impact of économie intégra
tion on the différence in govcrnmcnt expeuditure composition between
OECD countries over thc period 1970-1997. They show the existence of a con
vergence in the structure of government expenditures. Our analytical resuit
suggests that the deepening of économie intégration could then lcad to a
divergence in the évolution of the public expenditurey composition.
4 Welfare analysis
We now analyse thc public expenditures cfficicncy from a global point of
view. Observe first that wc can rcwrttc thc aggregatcd welfare function as
follows:
WT - W\ -h W2 = ST + HT + TLt (15)
where ST= (À1, + S2)l describes the total consumers' surplus, HT= (Hl + H2)l
represents thc total net subsidies to liouscliolds and {[-(■ s y{n\?[-\ -1-/(2^2)
gives thc total net profits reccivod by thesc householda.
Let us first consider the externality acting through thc total consum-
ers' surplus. So as to definc its aigtl and its magnitude, wc calculatc






ThilS, inercasing thc total consmners' surplus requires a coordinatod policy
inercasing thc level of net subsidy to firins in thc low-productivity eountry
and decreasing it in the other country. Statcd diffcrently, from thc consum-
ers' point of view, thcrc is an excessive agglomération of firrns in the high-
productivity country at the dcccntralizcd equilibrium. fndeed. when they
décide on their levels of net subsidies, governments do not take into account
thc impact of their choice on the spatial distribution of firms and in fine on
the consumers' surplus in the other country.Nelly Exbrayat, Cari Gaigné, Stéphane Riou 421
Finally, observe that whatever the levels of trade co.sts and thc pro-
ductivity wedge. the inefficiency of the public policy in the low-productivity
country is always more important than in thc other country. Indced. we get:
OW-r
0E\
-\ fis 11 <)£■>
Masli
Tins resuit lias an important implication with respect to the spatial
distribution of firnis. It hnplies that more agglomération in the high-produc-
tivity country is required in order to improve global welfare. This resuit is
close to thc one of Ottaviano and Van Yperscle (2005) who use a similar
framework. Assuming two countriea of différent market size, they show that
in order to improve the ovcrall welfare, a réduction in the non-cooperative
tax gap is necessary as it increases the agglomération of firms in the largest
country. In othcr words, when a eountry benefits from a locational advan-
tage, whether it coines from a lower production cost or a larger market size.
it seems that tho non-coopérative behavior of govemmeiits leads to a sub
optimal degree of agglomération in this country because the govcrnment of
the other country tries to improve its attractiveness by bcing more gencrous
with firme.
Our hypothesis of partial redistribution of profits in the economy
allows us to complète the welfare analysis of Ottaviano and van Yperselc
(2005). Assuming that ail profits remain in thc cconomy, they show that
capital taxation is always set at an inefficicntly high level in the country
bonefiting from a higher market size and at an inefficiently low level in tlie
other country, Our analysis reveals that if a similar conclusion prevails for
the public policy of the low-productivity country, it docs not hold for the
other country where the level of net subsidy to firms at the Nash equilib-
rium can beconie too high from thc social welfare point of view when the
share of profits repatriatcd outside the economy is important.
Proposition 5 At the non-coopérative equilibrium. the public expen-
diture policy cannot maximize global welfare: (i) in thc low-productivity
country. the level of net subsidy to firms is too high compared to the level
of net subsidy to households; (u) m the high-productivity country, the level
of 'net subsidy to households is too high compared to the level of net subsidy
to firms provided that a large fraction of profits rernains in thc cconomy or
trade costs are low enougli.Nelly Exbrayat, Cari Gaigné, Stéphane Riou 423
Benasay-Quêrê, A.. Gobalraja, N. and A. Tïannoy (2007). "Tax and public input
compétition" Economie Policy, vol. 22(50), pp. 385—43Û.
Behrens, K. and P. Picard (2005). 'Tax compétition, location, and horizontal foreign
direct investment", CORE Discussion Paper 2005/91.
Charlton, A. (2003). "Incentive bidding for mobile inveatment: économie consé
quences and potentiel responses", OECD Workîug Paper, u° 203.
UNGTAD (199fi). "Incentives and foreign direct trrvestments", New York and
Gencva: United Nations, Séries A n" 30.
Europoan Commission (2005). State Aid Seoreboanl. COM(2ÛÛ5)fâ4 final, Bruxelles.
Devereux, M.P., Griffith, R.. and A. Klomm. (2002). "Corporete incorac tax reforins
and international tax compétition", Economie. Policy, vol. 17(35), pp. 451-405.
Dreher, A., Sturni. .J-E. ami IL W. Ursprung (2(108). "The impact of globalisation
on the composition of government expenditures; évidence from panel data".
Public Choir.z, vol. 134(3-4), pp. 2G3--292.
Garrett, G. and D. Mitchell, (2001). "Globalization. government spendingand taxation
in the OECD". Européen Journal of Potitir.td Research, vol. 39(2), pp. 145-177,
Mander A. and I. Woot.un (2007). "Compétition for fin us in an oligopolistic indnstry:
Do fions or countiics bave to pay?1. DlSCUBELon paper 2007-13, Univcrsity of
Munich.
[nspection Générale (2007). Rapport sur les aides publiques aux entreprises, Inspection
générales des Finances, des Affaires Sociales et de l'Administration, France.
Keen, M. and M. Marchand (1997). ;iFiscal compétition and the pattern of public
spending", Journal of Public Economies, vol. 6(i(l), pp. 33-53.
Kind. M.. K. Midelfart-Knarvik. and G. Schjeldentp (2000). "Compefâng for capital
in a lurnpy world". Journal of Public Economies, vol. 78(3). pp. 253-274.
Ludema, R. and I. Wooton (2000). "Economie geography and the fiscal efîects of re-
gional intégration7'. Journal of International Economies, vol. 52(2), pp. 331-357.
Matsumoto, M. (2000). "A note on the composition of public expenditure under capital
tax compétition". International Tas and Public Finance, vol. 7(6), pp. 691-607.
Ottaviano G.I.P.. T. Tabuchi aad J.-F. Tinsse (2002). "Agglomération and trade
revisited". International Economie Rcview, vol. 43(2), pp. 409-43G.
Ottaviano. G. and 1". Van Ypersele (2005). "Market access and tax compétition"
Journal of International Economies, vol. 07(1), pp. 25-46.
Rodrik, D. (1997). Hax globalisation gorte too far'?, Washington D.C.: Instirute for
International Economies.
Itudrik, D. (199S). "Why do more opeu économies hâve liiggor govcrninents?", Journal
of Political Bconomy, vol. LÛ6(5), pp. 997-1032.
Sanz, t. and F. Veltisquez (2004). "The évolution and convergence of the government
exi>ei!diturc composition in the OECD countries", Public Choice, vol. 119( 1-2).
pp. 61-72.
Schnl/.e G. G. and H. W. Ursprung (1999). "Globalisation of the cconomy and the
nation slate", The World Eco-nomy.. vol. 22(3). pp. 295-352.
Zodrow, G.R., and P. Mieszkowski (198G). "Pîgou, Tîebout, property taxation and the
undeiprovisiou of local public good.s". Journal of Urban Economies, vol. 19(3),
pp. 356-370.